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OPINION OF THE COURT
                              
AMBRO, Circuit Judge
Thurmond Allen appeals an order of the District Court
denying his motion to suppress evidence seized while he and
others were detained by a police SWAT team during execution
of a search warrant at a bar where Allen worked as a security
guard.  The warrant, issued in conjunction with a homicide
investigation unrelated to Allen or to anyone else at the bar,
authorized collection of security videotapes.  The District Court
concluded that because the bar was located in a high-crime area,
because firearm-related crimes had been committed there, and
because persons possessing firearms were known to patronize
the bar, it was reasonable for the police to detain persons there
while executing the warrant.  Allen contends on appeal that this
detention was an illegal seizure under the Fourth Amendment,
and thus his statements to police and the evidence obtained as a
result of that detention should have been suppressed.
We examine the limits of the Supreme Court’s decisions
in Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), and Los Angeles
County v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609 (2007) (per curiam).  After
considering these cases and precedent of our own, and giving
deference to the District Court’s findings of fact, we conclude
that Allen’s detention did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
Thus we affirm.
  For example, one of the officers testified that when police1
collected security videos from Trinkle’s in connection with the
January 2008 homicide, the bar’s owner “became very
uncooperative and angry that we had, in fact, taken that video
equipment.” 
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I.
The District Court found the following facts after an
evidentiary hearing on Allen’s motion to suppress.  On May 10,
2008, an individual named Jimmy Ortiz was murdered in
Allentown, Pennsylvania, and police obtained reliable
information that the persons involved had retreated to a bar
called Trinkle’s Café (“Trinkle’s”).  Based on this information,
the police obtained a search warrant at approximately 4:00 p.m.
on Thursday, May 15, 2008, authorizing them to collect any
security videos in the bar that could be used to identify the
murder suspect.  No Trinkle’s owner or staff member was
suspected of involvement in the homicide. 
The police were familiar with Trinkle’s and its location.
It was in a high-crime area involving firearms and drugs, and
customers of it often had histories of engaging in violence,
firearm possession, and drug activity.  In January 2008, four
months before the Ortiz homicide, someone was shot inside
Trinkle’s, and a few weeks prior to the Ortiz homicide an
individual was arrested for illegally possessing a firearm inside
the bar.  In addition, prior to the homicide, the owner and staff
of Trinkle’s were “uncooperative” with police during
investigations of other incidents.   Given these facts, the police1
5decided to use the Allentown Emergency Response Team,
known as a SWAT team, to execute the warrant.
They did so at approximately 8:00 p.m., about four hours
after obtaining the warrant, and secured the premises inside and
outside the bar.  Five people — including Allen, who was on
duty as a Trinkle’s security guard — were standing directly in
front of the bar.  The SWAT team, wearing armor and with guns
drawn, ordered them to lie face down on the sidewalk with their
hands in front of them, and explained that they would be
detained just long enough to ensure the officers’ safety and for
the officers to gather the evidence they were seeking.
Allen was lying next to an individual named Robbie
Trader, who told one of the officers that he had a firearm.  The
officer took the firearm, verified that Trader had a permit to
carry it, and returned it to Trader, who was released.  Allen then
volunteered to one of the officers that he too had a firearm.  The
officer searched him, seized the gun, and inquired if he had a
permit for it.  Allen responded that he had an expired, out-of-
state permit.  When asked, Allen provided a false name,
Christopher Williams.  The police learned Allen’s real name
from someone who worked at the bar, and Allen was arrested.
It was subsequently disclosed that he had a prior felony
conviction.
A grand jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
returned a one-count indictment, charging Allen with unlawful
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  He moved to suppress evidence of the
firearm and his statements to the police as fruits of an illegal
seizure.  Following an evidentiary hearing, the District Court
6denied the motion in an oral ruling, concluding that pursuant to
Summers a “search warrant implicitly carries with it a limited
authorization to detain occupants of the place of the search and
to minimize the risk of harm to the officers,” and that pursuant
to Rettele the officers “took reasonable actions to secure the
premises and to ensure their own safety and the efficacy of the
search.”  Moreover, the Court found that Allen voluntarily
revealed to the police that he was armed.  Following the denial
of the motion to suppress, Allen pled guilty to the charge in the
indictment, but preserved his right to appeal the District Court’s
ruling on the suppression motion.  The Court sentenced Allen to
41 months’ imprisonment, a term of three years’ supervised
release, a fine of $1,000, and a special assessment of $100.  He
filed a timely appeal. 
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3231, which grants to district courts “original jurisdiction,
exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses against the
laws of the United States.”  We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291.
“We review the district court’s denial of [a] motion to
suppress for clear error as to the underlying facts, but exercise
plenary review as to its legality in light of the court’s properly
found facts.”  United States v. Lafferty, 503 F.3d 293, 298 (3d
Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 458
(3d Cir. 2003)).
  The District Court found also that the “officers had sufficient,2
specific and articulable facts to believe that persons who
frequented the bar could be armed and dangerous,” and thus
ruled that (1) “it was reasonable for [them] . . . to seize persons
in the area for an investigative stop and then do a limited search
for concealed weapons,” and (2) “it was reasonable to stop, pat
down and investigate these persons . . . .”  (App. 322-23
(emphases added).)  On this record, we question whether the
police would have been permitted to pat down everyone they
encountered at Trinkle’s.  See, e.g., United States v. Ritter, 416
F.3d 256, 269 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that “absent a reasonable
belief or suspicion that an individual encountered is armed,” a
person may not be patted down, even when he or she is
“encountered on the premises of property to be searched during
the course of executing a search warrant”) (emphasis added).
However, the District Court made no finding regarding whether
officers patted down the individuals they detained outside
Trinkle’s, and, more importantly, made no finding that Allen
7
III.
Allen argues that his detention outside Trinkle’s violated
his Fourth Amendment rights, and so his statements to police
and the seized firearm should have been suppressed as fruits of
the illegal detention.  However, based on the Supreme Court’s
treatment of Summers in its decision in Rettele, the officers were
permitted to detain those outside Trinkle’s during the execution
of the search warrant.  Accordingly, given that Allen’s detention
was legal, and given its factual finding that Allen volunteered to
police that he had a firearm before being searched, the Court did
not err when it denied Allen’s motion to suppress.2
himself was patted down before volunteering that he had a gun.
In addition, Allen does not argue that he was illegally searched,
only that his detention was illegal.  Thus, the issue of whether
the police would be justified in conducting a limited search of
the detained persons for concealed weapons is not before us in
this appeal, and we do not reach it.
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We begin by noting that Summers itself is largely
distinguishable from our case.  There, police officers were about
to execute a warrant to search a house for narcotics when they
encountered Summers descending the front steps.  452 U.S. at
693.  The officers requested Summers’s assistance in gaining
entry to the house and then detained him while they searched the
premises.  Id.  They found drugs in the basement, and after
confirming that Summers owned the house, they arrested him,
searched him, and found in his coat pocket an envelope
containing heroin.  Id.  Summers was charged with possession
of the heroin, and he sought to suppress the heroin found on him
as the product of an illegal search.  Id. at 694.
The Court framed the “dispositive question” as “whether
the initial detention of [Summers] violated his constitutional
right to be secure against an unreasonable seizure,” and
concluded that his detention was constitutionally permissible
because it was not overly intrusive and three law enforcement
interests (noted below) supported the detention.  Id. at 694, 701-
04.  The detention was not overly intrusive primarily because
the police had obtained a valid warrant to search for contraband,
meaning that a “neutral and detached magistrate had found
probable cause to believe that the law was being violated in that
house,” and so “a substantial invasion of the privacy of the
9persons who resided there” was already authorized.  Id. at 701.
Thus, “[t]he detention of one of the residents while the premises
were searched, although admittedly a significant restraint on his
liberty, was surely less intrusive than the search itself.”  Id.  In
other words, the “articulable facts” of the detention supported its
legality, because a “judicial officer ha[d] determined that police
ha[d] probable cause to believe that someone in the home [was]
committing a crime,” and the connection of Summers to the
home gave the “officer[s] an easily identifiable and certain basis
for determining that suspicion of criminal activity justifie[d] a
detention of” Summers.  Id. at 703-04.
The three law enforcement interests the Court identified
as supporting the detention were: (1) “preventing flight in the
event that incriminating evidence is found;” (2) “minimizing the
risk of harm to the officers” (because “the execution of a
warrant to search for narcotics is the kind of transaction that
may give rise to sudden violence”); and (3) “the orderly
completion of the search” (because an occupant’s “self-interest
may induce [him] to open locked doors or locked containers to
avoid the use of force” that can be damaging to property).  Id. at
702-03. 
Summers itself is largely off point; it relied heavily on the
fact that the warrant authorized a search for contraband, which
meant that there was reason to believe that crimes were taking
place in the home, which in turn allowed the detention of its
resident.  Here, a neutral and detached magistrate did not find
probable cause to believe that violations of law were occurring
at Trinkle’s.  The magistrate found only that there was probable
cause to believe that evidence, in the form of security videotapes
that might implicate the murder suspects, could be found at the
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bar.  Allen’s detention thus did not involve contraband that was
likely to implicate him in criminal activity, and his connection
to the bar did not give the officers “an easily identifiable and
certain basis for determining that suspicion of criminal activity
justifie[d]” his detention.  Id. at 703-04.  Indeed, the Summers
Court specifically stated that “[i]f the evidence that a citizen’s
residence is harboring contraband is sufficient to persuade a
judicial officer that an invasion of the citizen’s privacy is
justified, it is constitutionally reasonable to require that citizen
to remain while officers of the law execute a valid warrant to
search his home.”  Id. at 704-05.  This reasoning does not apply
here, where the search warrant merely sought evidence of a
crime at a public establishment and that evidence was unrelated
to any of the individuals then present there.
As for the law enforcement interests identified in
Summers, the Government does not argue that preventing flight
in the event that incriminating evidence is found justified
Allen’s detention, and for good reason — the police were at
Trinkle’s simply to collect security videotapes, they had no
reason to believe that Allen had any involvement in the Ortiz
homicide, and they had no reason to believe that Allen would
flee.  
In addition, the detention of Allen did not advance an
orderly completion of the search, as there was no indication that
Allen even knew where the videotapes were located.  While the
Government argues that he was an employee “who could
potentially assist the police . . . [and] could have directed the
police to the security equipment” (Appellee’s Br. at 32), there is
no evidence that the police ever attempted to have Allen assist
them in this way.  The Government further contends that the
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detention of Allen was justified by a “possible concern about the
destruction of evidence given that the bar’s staff had been
hostile and uncooperative when law enforcement had previously
sought to obtain the exact same type of evidence.”  (Id. at 31.)
But given the number of officers present at the bar and that they
did not suspect any of the bar’s ownership or staff of playing a
role in the Ortiz homicide, the risk of destruction of evidence
was slight.
The only law enforcement interest relevant to our case,
and indeed the only part of the Summers Court’s reasoning that
is applicable to the facts here, is minimizing the risk of harm to
the officers.  Indeed, the District Court relied solely on this
interest in denying Allen’s motion to suppress.  We conclude
that it was correct to do so because, per Rettele, in certain
situations safety concerns alone may authorize a brief detention
of the occupants of an establishment during execution of a
search warrant, and the distinction between a search for
contraband and a search for evidence is largely immaterial.
In Rettele, police investigating a fraud and identity-theft
crime ring obtained a search warrant for two houses where they
believed they could find the suspects, four African-American
individuals.  The warrant authorized the police to search the
homes and three of the suspects, one of whom was known to
own a registered handgun, for documents and computer files.
550 U.S. at 610.  However, one of the homes had been sold, and
when the police arrived to execute the warrant, they found a
Caucasian family at the home.  Nonetheless, the police entered
the house with guns drawn, ordered the 17-year-old son they
encountered at the door to lie face down on the ground, and
ordered the couple they found in the bedroom to get out of bed
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despite their wearing no clothes.  The couple was held at
gunpoint for one to two minutes before being allowed to dress
(and a few minutes thereafter to sit on the couch in the living
room).  The police then realized their mistake, apologized, and
left the house.  Id. at 611.
A civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 followed, asserting
a violation of Fourth Amendment rights.  The Supreme Court
concluded there was no violation, holding that “[w]hen officers
execute a valid warrant and act in a reasonable manner to protect
themselves from harm, . . . the Fourth Amendment is not
violated.”  Id. at 616.  The Court concluded that “[t]he orders by
the police to the occupants, in the context of this lawful search,
were permissible, and perhaps necessary, to protect the safety of
the deputies,” because “[b]lankets and bedding can conceal a
weapon, and one of the suspects was known to own a firearm.”
Id. at 614.  The Court noted that “‘[t]he risk of harm to both the
police and the occupants is minimized if the officers routinely
exercise unquestioned command of the situation.’”  Id. at 615
(quoting Summers, 452 U.S. at 702-03).  It even concluded that
the discrepancy between the race of the suspects and the persons
in the house was immaterial, because “[t]he presence of some
Caucasians in the residence did not eliminate the possibility that
the suspects lived there as well.”  Id. at 613.  Moreover, the
Rettele Court ruled this way despite the warrant at issue
authorizing a search for mere evidence, and not contraband.  Id.
at 610.
Rettele’s treatment of Summers compels the conclusion
that Allen’s detention did not violate his Fourth Amendment
rights.  First, the police here were executing a valid search
warrant for evidence at a bar located in a high-crime area, where
  As Allen points out, the risk of harm to the officers here was3
at least in part created by the decision to execute the warrant at
8:00 p.m. on a Thursday night, when the bar was likely to be
busy.  Allen contends that “[i]t would have been far more
reasonable to visit Trinkle’s during off hours, at which time the
only persons present would be ownership, staff, and perhaps [a]
stray patron,” perhaps intimating that an ulterior motive was
behind the timing of the execution of the warrant.  (Appellant’s
Br. at 22-23.)  We agree with Allen that the timing is puzzling.
However, while the record does not reveal how long the police
had their information before applying for the warrant, they did
execute the warrant only hours after it issued, perhaps to
minimize the chance that the security videotapes would get
recorded over.  Regardless, “[w]hether a Fourth Amendment
violation has occurred turns on an objective assessment of the
officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances
confronting him at the time, and not on the officer’s actual state
of mind at the time the challenged action was taken.”  Maryland
v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1985) (internal quotation and
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patrons were known to carry firearms, and where several
firearm-related crimes had recently been committed, just as the
police in Rettele were executing a search warrant for evidence
at the home of an individual known to own a licensed firearm.
Under these circumstances, the police were justified in “tak[ing]
reasonable action to secure the premises and to ensure their own
safety and the efficacy of the search,” id. at 614, including
detaining those present at gunpoint.  Second, several people
were present at Trinkle’s, and so the police were justified in
taking a “moment to secure the [premises] and ensure that other
persons were not close by or did not present a danger.”   Id. at3
citation omitted).  On this evidence, we cannot say that the
police action here was objectively unreasonable under the
circumstances.
  While the Leveto Court held that plaintiffs “successfully4
alleged . . . violations of their Fourth Amendment rights,”
judgment was entered in favor of the defendants because they
“were entitled to qualified immunity due to uncertainty in the
case law.”  258 F.3d at 160.
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615.  Finally, just as the brief duration of the detention in Rettele
was deemed reasonable under the circumstances, the detention
here was just long enough for the police to ensure their safety
and collect the evidence they sought.  Moreover, in Rettele,
“[t]here is no accusation that the detention here was prolonged.”
Id. 
Allen contends that our decision in Leveto v. Lapina, 258
F.3d 156 (3d Cir. 2001), in which we concluded that the
detention at issue was unreasonable,  requires us to find a Fourth4
Amendment violation here.  However, without trivializing being
held on the ground at gunpoint, the detention in Leveto was far
more intrusive than Allen’s detention here.  There, agents of the
Internal Revenue Service, as part of an investigation into a
doctor’s tax practices, carried out a search warrant at the
doctor’s office, detained him and his wife for almost eight
hours, restricted them from communicating with others for the
entire period, continually interrogated them, subjected the doctor
to “the inconvenience and indignity of a forced ride with IRS
agents to his home and back to his office,” and “prevented [him]
from responding to client needs.”  Id. at 160, 169. 
  Allen raises an additional argument in this appeal, that the5
felon-in-possession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), is
unconstitutional on its face and as applied to the facts of this
case.  In United States v. Gateward, 84 F.3d 670 (3d Cir. 1996),
we upheld “the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) as a valid
exercise of the commerce power,” id. at 672, and in United
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Additionally, we ruled in Leveto that “there was no
compelling need to detain Dr. Leveto to protect the safety of the
agents,” because it was not an investigation “into a type of
offense often accompanied by violence.”  Id. at 171.  But, as
noted above, Rettele, decided after Leveto, counsels that
protecting the safety of the agents alone can justify a reasonable
detention of an individual during execution of a search warrant.
Finally, Allen points out our noting in Leveto that while
an “articulable and individualized suspicion” of criminal activity
can exist “when law enforcement officers have a valid warrant
to search a home for contraband and the detainee is an occupant
of the home . . .[,] the same may not be true if the search warrant
merely seeks evidence.”  Id. at 171-72 (citing Summers, 452
U.S. at 703-05 & n.20).  However, as explained above, Rettele
rendered the evidence/contraband distinction immaterial where
occupants of a building are detained to ensure the safety of the
officers executing a search warrant.  Here again Rettele
supersedes Leveto.
In short, our decision today is not controlled by Leveto.
Following Rettele, we conclude that Allen’s Fourth Amendment
rights were not violated when the police briefly detained him
during execution of the search warrant at Trinkle’s.5
States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 2001), we
“reaffirm[ed] our holding in Gateward,” and ruled that “proof
. . . that the gun had traveled in interstate commerce, at some
time in the past, was sufficient to satisfy the interstate commerce
element.”  Id. at 197, 205.  Absent en banc review, we may not
revisit these decisions, and therefore reject Allen’s challenge to
the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1).  
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*    *    *    *    *
We hold that Allen’s brief detention during execution of
the search warrant at Trinkle’s did not violate his rights under
the Fourth Amendment.  Accordingly, we affirm the ruling of
the District Court denying his motion to suppress.
